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Irony and the Question of Presentation  
in The American Scene 
 
Richard ANKER 
Université Clermont Auvergne 
 
Résumé : l’article tente de dégager de The American Scene une expérience de présentation 
esthétique (Darstellung) en tant qu’expérience obsédante sinon principielle du texte. Il 
commence par problématiser la question de l’« œil » jamesien, en faisant un bref détour hors 
du mémoire de voyage et en marquant une certaine distance vis-à-vis des lectures 
pragmatistes, historicistes et politico-culturelles de cette œuvre de James. Plusieurs scénarios 
de The American Scene sont évoqués afin de souligner le caractère irréconciliable des 
dimensions performatives et constatives, tropologiques et spéculaires du langage en tant que 
médium de présentation, lequel rend impossible toute tentative de réduire le texte à un 
document historico-politique, et qui sous-tend au contraire le caractère ironique du discours. 
Le scénario présentatif qui se déroule à Harvard Hall au premier chapitre du livre est examiné 
plus en détail afin de dégager du texte une toute autre force critique, toute autre que celles qui 
feraient trop facilement abstraction du texte en le réduisant par diverses manières à son 
contexte politico-culturel ou historique. Force critique susceptible de se présenter en tant que 
contre-force à l’idéologie esthétique que James voit s’installer aux Etats-Unis comme ce qu’il 
appelle le « hotel spirit », mode spectaculaire et nihiliste de l’esprit américain. 
 
Mots clés : Henry James, The American Scene, ironie, présentation (Darstellung), tropologie, 
finitude, histoire, spectacle, liberté. 
 
*** 
 
 
I. Brooding 
 
Henry James never suffered the illusion of pure perception. In The American Scene, 
one of his most overtly referential works, he employed the phrase “naked eye” only between 
quotation marks (190-191). Since all the ways of not reading The American Scene seem to 
turn around a compulsion either to ignore what James, back in his earliest days as a writer, 
called the “fatal obliquity of vision” (1975 47) or to devise “theoretical” (ideological) 
strategies for getting around it, getting back to the naked eye (empirical reality) through 
variously contrived conceptions of mediated immediacy – “theatrical,” “performative,” 
“pragmatist” –, it seems a good idea to begin by focusing attention on the painter’s eye. 
Doing so also has the advantage of enabling me to set the stage for my treatment further on of 
a key scenario in The American Scene, the presentation that unfolds in Harvard Hall of 
Sargent’s portrait of Major Henry Lee Higginson, in the book’s first chapter. Sargent, I shall 
argue, whose “faculty of brooding reflection” James admired (1989 227), is the specular 
double of the brooding tourist of The American Scene – or, with a slight yet significant 
adjustment of the rotating mirror, for there always is one, of the author himself – and the 
portrait of Higginson a reflective image of James’s text. Perhaps none of that can be clear to 
us, however, if we have not first problematized the question of the eye, that of the painter, not 
as a singular, aestheticizing variation upon a supposedly neutral or “naked” act of seeing, of 
course, but as the artistic reduction to the (groundless) grounds of seeing, which, in the final 
analysis, are nothing other than what I have just called “text.”  
Of course, abstracting the eye from the “scene,” whether it be in the theatrical sense 
that the term possesses in a novel like The Tragic Muse, for example – where the scenic 
performance of Miriam Rooth constitutes the specular basis of the artistic faculty of the 
portraitist, Nick Dormer – or in the metaphorical sense that the term most often possesses in 
The American Scene, is a somewhat risky affair, and, for the purposes of my reading, a 
wholly provisional one. It is risky because it involves a regression from appearance, from the 
“object” of perception, to what in Kant is called the “formal” condition of appearance, which, 
as the philosopher points out, is nothing in itself, has no substance.
1
 Yet this nothing is not a 
pure privation either, a nihil negativum, but – I borrow here from Gerard Granel’s reading of 
Kant (79) – a nihil positivum. What is a nihil positivum? Here, happily perhaps, we can turn to 
James, a “formalist” as everyone knows, who did not have to (mis)read Kant, it appears, to 
postulate that the “Ding an sich” is not an object, nor a concept for that matter, but a form. Or, 
better perhaps, a figure. Abstracting the eye provisionally then from the scene in a regression 
that also informs Kant’s critical philosophy, not to mention the later attempts by Husserl to 
uncover the transcendental conditions of consciousness, we can observe the nihil positivum 
present itself in the intensely self-reflexive vision of Nick Dormer, the portraitist of The 
Tragic Muse, as, indeed, the “thing in itself,” qualified by James, not for lack of a better term 
of course but for lack of an authentically positive one, as possessing a certain “mystic value.” 
Dormer’s brooding reflection, as he “yearns over” this insubstantial figure on which his 
artistic vocation depends – on which, in other words, the faculty of seeing depends –, must be 
quoted here in full. It is late in the novel, the genetic process that informs its narrative 
structure and Dormer’s artistic becoming within it is near accomplishment, and Miriam 
Rooth, the actress whose “productive force” reflects that of the portraitist himself, and will 
thereby ultimately figure it for him more effectively than the dim figure in this intensely self-
reflective scenario can, has just departed from one of her sittings for him: 
 
It occurred to him [Nick Dormer] that there were deep differences in the famous artistic life. 
Miriam was already in a glow of glory – which moreover was probably but a faint spark in 
relation to the blaze to come; and as he closed the door on her and took up his palette to rub it 
with a dirty cloth the little room in which his own battle was practically to be fought looked 
woefully cold and grey and mean. It was lonely and yet at the same time was peopled with 
unfriendly shadows – so thick he foresaw them gather in winter twilights to come – the duller 
conditions, the longer patiences, the less immediate and less personal joys. His late beginning 
was there and his wasted youth, the mistakes that would still bring forth children after their 
image, the sedentary solitude, the grey mediocrity, the poor explanations, the effect of 
foolishness he dreaded even from afar off in having to ask people to wait, and wait longer, and 
wait again, for a fruition which to their sense at least might well prove a grotesque anti-climax. 
He yearned enough over it, however it should figure, to feel that this possible pertinacity might 
enter into comparison even with such a productive force as Miriam’s. That was after all in his 
bare studio the most collective dim presence, the one that kept him company best as he sat there 
and that made it the right place however wrong – the sense that it was to the thing in itself 
which he was attached. This was Miriam’s case too, but the sharp contrast, which she showed 
him she also felt, was in the number of other things she got with the thing in itself. 
I hasten to add that our young man had hours when this last mystic value struck him as 
requiring for its full operation no adjunct whatever – as being in its own splendor a summary of 
all adjuncts and apologies. (1995 462) 
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 Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason: “The mere form of intuition, without substance, is in itself not an object, 
but the merely formal condition of one (as appearance), like pure space and pure time, which are to be sure 
something, as the forms for intuiting, but are not in themselves objects that are intuited (ens imaginarium).” 
(382) 
 
Hardly dramatic stuff, as James was forced to acknowledge in his preface in 
discussing the thanklessness of artistically presenting the artist’s presentative faculty (he 
would not try it again in novelistic form until the aborted The Sense of the Past), that is his 
“productive force.” The “only honors” of the “preference for art,” James writes in the preface, 
are those of “contraction, concentration and a seemingly deplorable indifference to everything 
but itself,” a preference which, from an empirical perspective, he goes on to point out, “can 
only appear as a marked instance of somebody’s willingness to pass mainly for an ass.” (1984 
1106)
2
 In our age of cultural studies and “new” historicism Dormer has indeed passed mainly 
for an ass (Rowe, Blair), while previously, in intrinsic-formalist approaches to the text, a 
certain ambiguity inherent to his accomplishment as a portraitist was consistently interpreted 
as an ambiguity with respect to that accomplishment (Edel, Powers, Krook), taking the 
“preference for art” more seriously than it nowadays appears respectable to do but failing 
nonetheless to recognize the essentially ambiguous or equivocal nature of artistic vision in 
James. Nowhere in the novel is this essential ambiguity more evident than in this little 
scenario, where what presents itself is not an object of presentation but rather, however dimly 
it “figures,” and it is “dim” indeed, the formal conditions of presentative experience itself, 
that is, the whole shadowy, impersonal structure of the artistic life as it is both “foreseen” and 
recollected in accordance with the genetic principle that determines both Dormer’s vocation 
as an artist and the narrative representation of it in the novel. Representation in James is never 
the imitation of a transcendental order, as in the Platonist model, but part of a chain of being 
on its way to its teleological end, a process revealed in a “flash,” one will recall, in the famous 
nightmare that unfolds in the Galérie d’Apollon. The same genetic process that is revealed in 
the nightmare underwrites the narrative structure of The Tragic Muse, as is self-reflexively 
glimpsed here by Nick Dormer, the artistic reflector of the novel, in language no less exalted 
than that employed by James in his autobiography: “thing in itself,” “last mystic value […] 
requiring for its full operation no adjunct whatever,” “being in its own splendor a summary of 
all adjuncts and apologies,” etc. The difference between the two scenarios is the difference 
between a subject still plunged in the becoming of his destiny and just scarcely able to make 
out its contours, on one hand, and a subject which has surmounted the teleological movement 
of his becoming by awakening from it, on the other, an “awakening” which retrospectively 
rounds the genetic process off into a graspable whole separate from the no-longer captive 
subject. The fact that Dormer (a homonym of course of dormeur, meaning “sleeper” in 
French) is still immersed in the process which underwrites his own artistic becoming makes 
the glimpse he catches of it all the more impressive, and ought to make the reader aware of 
the self-reflexive capacity of this character’s artistic consciousness. 
That is not all, however, that Dormer proves capable of seeing and which is essential 
for us to see if we wish to understand seeing in James. The subject of the nightmare awakens, 
one will recall, from his sleep within his sleep to pursue the “visitant” responsible for his 
awakening down the corridor of the Galérie d’Apollon, the “dimly descried figure” ultimately 
exceeding the genetic process it had put into motion and withdrawing from the totalizing 
cognition of the dreamer’s “immense hallucination.” In a structurally analogous manner, 
Gabriel Nash, the specular figure on which Dormer’s own “beginning” depends – as a careful 
reading of their encounter in the first chapter of the novel could reveal –, a figure that is 
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 James returns later in the preface to what he recognizes as the near impossibility of presenting artistic success – 
not failure, or mere amateurism, another thing – in a dramatically effective manner: “I strove in vain, I feel, to 
embroil and adorn this young man on whom a hundred ingenious touches are thus lavished: he has insisted in the 
event on looking as simple and flat as some brass check or engraved number, the symbol and guarantee of a 
stored treasure. The better part of him is locked too far away from us, and the part we see has to pass for – well, 
what it passes for, so lamentedly, among his friends and relatives.” (1118) In short, Dormer is to be interpreted 
as a sign of artistic achievement, readable of course as such, but invisible from the merely empirical perspective 
of readers and other characters. 
moreover described late in the narrative “visitant,” and a “ghostly” one to boot, eludes the 
representational faculty of his friend and, as we read, “steer[s] his course straight through the 
eventual narrow pass and go[es] down over the horizon” (1995 470). In both the nightmare 
and the novel, a figural excess, irreducible to cognition, conspicuously withdraws from the 
genetic process that is initiated by the subject’s encounter with it.3 No less admirable than 
Dormer’s “so thoroughly inward” (1984 1106) glimpse of the “productive force” on which his 
artistic vocation depends, as we saw previously, is his recognition of the excess of this force 
in his final encounter with Nash: “You’ll ‘slope,’ my dear fellow, – you’ll quietly slope; and 
it will be all right and inevitable, though I shall miss you greatly at first” (1995 471). Like the 
nautical imagery of “going down over the horizon,” what the word “slope” suggests is a 
tropological drift or deviation that exceeds the totalizing cognition of artistic self-reflection, 
an excess that is figuratively presented in the nightmare and dramatically represented in the 
equivocal and ultimately ghostly character of Gabriel Nash in the novel. What all this reveals 
is that the nihil positivum is divided, split. The genetic structure of the presentative 
experience, of the productive force as an autotelic unity having within itself its own origin and 
its own end (“requiring for its full operation no adjunct whatever”), does not succeed after all 
in reconciling its telos with its origin. The genetic structure of consciousness reveals itself as 
traversed by a tropological force which exceeds it, and which presents itself in the text not in 
the form of a mere contradiction which might be overcome at an ulterior stage of the genetic 
process, but as the presentation of the limit of presentation, of presentative (or representative) 
experience itself. Far from dissimulating this split or this discontinuity which underwrites all 
cognitive experience, James thematizes it in dramatic terms. The same tropological excess, 
eluding the genetic structure of cognition, is precisely what reveals itself to Dormer in his late 
“revelation” of Nash: “It struck our young man that he had never seen his subject before, and 
yet somehow this revelation was not produced by the sense of actually seeing it.” (1995 474) 
Between the genetic structure of cognition and the tropological principle which exceeds it, or, 
more precisely, traversing this structure as its true origin and its true end, appears an 
irreducible disjunction which James repeatedly and insistently brings to the reader’s attention. 
There is nothing more equivocal in The Tragic Muse, nor in James’s work as a whole, than 
what we might call a duplicitous allegiance to these two irreducibly opposed figural 
economies, one specular and genetic in structure, the other tropological. This is true not only 
for James’s fictional writings but also for The American Scene. 
 
It would not be saying much to say that since the advent of cultural studies and the 
“repositioning,” in the marketing sense of the term (Posnock, 1999 273), of The American 
Scene as a central work in James’s oeuvre little serious attention has been paid to the question 
of form. Academic winds have been blowing in another direction for some time. Recent 
cultural analysts and new historicists have occasionally been critical of work from older 
schools of thematic criticism, works that take James’s apparently harsh comments on the 
“alienism” of the Jews he encounters in New York, for example, too literally or at face value, 
and promoted reading practices which privilege a more complex relationship between text and 
context, and theatrical or performative notions of the writer’s self that appear to problematize 
the former self of Cartesian autonomy, but much in these productions suggests that 
ideological motivations for reading not only die hard but have acquired new purpose. The 
motivations themselves change, of course, but not the ideological impulse itself. By 
“ideological” I do not mean the endeavor to uncover a critical force that a literary text like 
The American Scene may possess, nor the attempt to understand and to define its historicity, 
but the compulsion to believe that formal and thematic, performative and constative, or in the 
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 For an analysis of The Tragic Muse, which I can scarcely adumbrate here, see my Henry James. Le Principe 
spectral de la représentation (33-160). 
terms of the duplicity just presented, tropological and specular functions of the text can fuse 
or harmonize synthetically as a basis for viable readings. Such an ideological manner of 
reading is precisely what Ross Posnock proposes when he claims to uncover in The American 
Scene “a pragmatism that turns aesthetics from contemplation to action that cuts against the 
grain of capitalist efficiency and utility,” and goes on to affirm that this pragmatist tradition 
he finds enacted in James “resolves the obdurate conflict between aesthetics and politics.” 
(1999 277) Such efforts to reconcile aesthetics and politics, in other words to transform 
aesthetics from a solely contemplative or reflective category into an active and purposeful one 
(a gesture typical of pragmatism), are of course as old as the hills, going back in modern 
literary-critical memory to Schiller’s attempt to appropriate Kant in his On the Aesthetic 
Education of Man. Such ideological endeavors most often of course appear with laudable 
intentions, and Posnock’s aim of divulging a critical force in James’s text that could be an 
effective counter to the capitalist mode of discipline and management of the American spirit 
is certainly admirable. His contextualization of the text makes The Trial of Curiosity a richly 
informative document that is indispensable to all historically minded readers of The American 
Scene. But his conception of Jamesian curiosity as a form of mimetic receptivity that 
“imitates” the object rather than “subsuming” it (Posnock, 1991 142), that conditions a self 
that is responsive to indeterminacy and the contingencies of history in the place of a monadic 
self invested in property and the grounds of its autonomy, is based on an overly restrictive 
conception of mimesis (one which maintains in an unproblematic manner that there is such a 
thing as an “object” prior to its mimetic presentation) and fails to take into account the genetic 
structure of representation in James’s writing. One has difficulty speaking of Sara Blair’s 
ideological interpretation of James with the same eagerness to point out its qualities and to 
find some degree of critical complicity. Immediately preceding her chapter on The American 
Scene in her Henry James and the Writing of Race and Nation appears a chapter devoted to 
The Tragic Muse, hardly surprising given the tropes of racial and national identity that are at 
work in the novel, in which the reader is informed that in order for its aesthetic program of 
Anglo-Saxon “nation-building” to be sustained the novel “must make Gabriel Nash 
disappear,” indeed write him out as a ghost, due to the dangerous exposure of a “low” form of 
cosmopolitanism this character represents and that James wishes to recuperate in his 
novelistic “revision of genteel cultural politics.” (154-155) Blair’s ideological blindness to the 
formal structure and to the tropological deviation of the text, a deviation I alluded to 
previously, does not limit itself to her politically determined interpretation of Nash’s 
disappearance, although that blindness reaches perhaps an interpretive climax when she 
informs us, quoting sympathetically Joseph Litvak, that Nash’s disappearance “represents an 
‘extreme,’ if not ‘terroristic,’ instance of James’s ‘counterplotting’” against this character in 
order to sustain his genteel nation-building agenda. Miriam Ro[o]th, the Jewish actress and 
“structural center,” as James puts it (1984 1108), of the novel, must also be white-washed as 
Blair sees it in order for the novel’s “racial logic” (157) to cohere, “transfigured from 
cabotine to ‘productive force’” in a mere clean-up act designed to attenuate and disguise the 
real threat of the character’s “contestatory power” as “woman and Jew” (153). In fact, this 
productive force designates a sacrificial “turning” of the tropological deviation that Miriam’s 
Jewishness represents into a framed and delimited mode of theatrical performance 
constituting the specular basis of perception in James, a “tragic” severing of mimetic alterity 
that is the condition of possibility of cognition itself (which is why Nash’s tropological 
deviation, spurning this sacrifice, appears as “ghostly” in the eyes of the portraitist at the end 
of the novel), something of much deeper and vaster aesthetic and political consequences than 
Blair appears to suspect in her short-sighted interpretation, or occultation rather, of the text’s 
“central” tropological event.4 If Blair’s interpretation teaches us anything it is that racial and 
ethnic tropes must be read in accordance with the tropological structure of the text, indeed to 
the very limits of that structure and beyond its formal closure as a mimetological system, as 
the author himself in this case reads them (and as Dormer “sees” them), not as “performative 
documents” (the key aesthetico-political oxymoron of her book) endowed with a merely 
provisionally mediated referential function. All of this is directly related to the critic’s reading 
of The American Scene because it is against the background of the racial logic deduced here 
that Blair construes her misguided notion of a “conversion” that would have taken place in 
James, a conversion from the genteel nation-builder who must reject the “unstable alterity” 
(154) that Jewish and low cosmopolitan figures like Miriam Ro[o]th and Gabriel Nash 
represent to the “documentary observer” (her naked-eye stand-in for the brooding analyst) 
who “cannily represents” a “theatre of nation-building” where “alien forces participate in the 
making of a distinctly American race.” (163) Blind to the tropological excess of James’s texts 
due to a compulsion to foreclose its play within a conservative notion of performative 
language and theatricality (the fruit it appears of what the critic calls her “post-deconstructive, 
‘new’ historicist” training” [212]), Blair can only conceive what she sees as James’s openness 
to Jewish “phantasmagoria” as being the result of his empirical encounter with ethnic 
otherness, that figured by the Jewish immigrants in the lower East Side of New York. 
Critics who incorporate what they appear to think is a sufficient dose of 
“deconstructive” or of “performative” interpretive practice to further claims of a newly 
fashioned reconciliation of the political and the aesthetic, of the documentary and the 
performative, are enacting a compulsion which would not be worth commenting on were it 
not in all likelihood inescapable. The closing words of Blair’s book warn us of the 
interpretive risk of “premature foreclosure” that her own reading seeks to prevent (214), and 
even if, as I have suggested, her reading tightens the screw considerably in its ideological 
reduction of the text to selected cultural signifieds, the question remains open as to what a 
foreclosure that was not premature might be. This supposes that foreclosure of some kind is 
necessary, that reading is an act that inevitably produces meaning as the reconciliation of the 
signifier and the signified, form and content, tropes or figures and referential elements of a 
historical, cultural or political nature. The same is true at the level of cognition itself, which 
must ultimately be conceived as an act of reading, as James’s work constantly teaches or 
reminds us. Despite his deep skepticism about the possibility of “unprejudiced” vision, as the 
author puts it in the same youthful letter to Sargeant Perry I alluded to earlier, a skepticism 
that he almost cruelly, as it appears, was willing later in his career to employ in cold scrutiny 
of the desperate governess of “The Turn of the Screw” as she seeks, and murderously 
achieves, foreclosure of the ghostly and vertiginous spiraling of the tropological deviation (or, 
in her view, deviance) she is exposed to, James himself insists over and over again, in 
multiple guises, in various contexts, on the cognitive necessity of “mak[ing] a sense” (202), 
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 Blair, as I have already suggested, has little interest in the complex unfolding of Dormer’s artistic vocation, 
grounded in a chain of tropological and mimetological substitutions which she completely ignores; the fact that 
Dormer fails to paint a portrait of Nash, for the reasons we are aware of, is for her the result of the painter’s 
ethnic chauvinism, evidence of his “fundamental inability to reinvent the […] Anglo-Saxon character” (Blair 
156). While traditional formalist readings like those offered by Lyall H. Powers and Dorothea Krook at least 
recognized a certain ambiguity pertaining to Dormer’s artistic achievement, and wondered about it, as I’ve 
already remarked, they also perceived Gabriel Nash as something of a riddle, while Blair and Rowe tighten the 
screws of their ideological interpretations to the point of effacing all ambiguity and excess in James’s text (for 
Rowe Nash is one of a number of “irrelevant characters” in a novel that becomes interesting only when read as a 
“struggle between homosocial cultural conventions of London politics and flexible gender roles of aesthetic 
culture” [Rowe 4]). On a certain “aesthetic religiosity” in James and the “Judeo-Christian” structure of The 
Tragic Muse, the formal and representational logic of which determines Miriam Ro[o]th’s “conversion” and her 
“sacrifice” as an artist, see Henry James. Le Principe spectral de la représentation, op. cit., p. 97-100. 
as the restless analyst of The American Scene emphasizes, were it only, as it often appears, as 
remedy to the crisis of exposure to tropological excess. The obvious fact that these crises are 
themselves triggered (for the restless analyst and the governess alike) by what is called “the 
appeal of a scene,” in other words by some remarkable site or incident in the surrounding 
environment that elicits a response in the form of the linguistic activity that is responsible for 
creating the epistemological tension that little by little becomes critical, underscores the 
genetic structure of the loop between origin and end, ground and figure, impression and 
meaning that always risks going haywire and leading to “madness” (22), to a “go[ing] to 
pieces” (202), instead of, or on the way to, the production of sense. The uncontrollable and 
endless circling that meaning’s foreclosure intends to stall, in order precisely that the process 
not take the form of an open-ended spiral, as in “The Turn of the Screw,” is a consequence of 
what James calls at one point – in a scenario that we will look at more closely further on – 
“an inspiration working perhaps even beyond its consciousness” (47), in other words, a 
tropological performativity in language that is irreducible to language’s own inescapably 
descriptive or constative function. The disjunction between these two linguistic functions, 
each of which has its claim to make on the writer – and perhaps never more so than in such an 
overtly referential work as The American Scene –, or the gap within language’s 
“consciousness” of itself, ruins the possibility of the text’s functioning in a reliably 
documentary manner. 
Despite the fact that travel writing is generally seen as belonging to a simpler mode of 
referentiality than most literary writing, The American Scene is an essentially ironic text, 
albeit at a less threatening pitch of equivocal insight than James’s previous first-person 
narrative, The Sacred Fount. It is ironic in the sense that it reveals in every act of sense-
making that its author falls victim to – for the restless analyst can no more forebear 
committing this act than the author’s distraught governess can – the rhetorical deviation or 
uncontrollability that undercuts meaning and severs cognitive awareness from itself. This 
ironical mode of awareness is based on the same equivocal form of cognition that James’s 
portraitist, Nick Dormer, proves capable of registering in his apprehension of Gabriel Nash, as 
we saw previously. What Dormer discerns – and it is the kind of insight that James attributes 
in such a direct manner only to surrogate artists like Dormer and Ralph Pendrel of The Sense 
of the Past, and more perilously to the anonymous first-person narrator of The Sacred Fount – 
is the hiatus, the disjunction between the specular and the tropological, the constative and the 
performative functions of language that Nash, in his ghost-like manner, figures or represents. 
Irony, then, in the sense I am using the term is not a mere aesthetic device (employed to 
achieve a playful or an elegant distance in relation to what is being said), but a paradoxical 
mode of allegiance to the two opposing functions of language, performative and constative.
5
 
This allegiance does not lead to some higher mode of reconciliation between the two 
functions, as may appear to be the case in a writer less epistemologically rigorous than James, 
but always ends up reinforcing the evidence of their incompatibility, the disruptive nature of 
their encounter, as in Dormer’s bewildering “revelation” of what he cannot “see.” Or in Ralph 
Pendrel’s enigmatic insight: “He saw what was beyond sense.” (1917 87) To employ the trope 
of irony to define a mode of cognitive insight, as I am doing here, is in effect to subvert the 
more conventional understanding of the trope as a discursive figure used by a subject to create 
effects, diverting or manipulative, and to define it, provisionally at least, as an act of cognition 
that sees that there is no way of reconciling what it sees with the cognitive act itself, that there 
is a figurative excess in the making of sense. That this ironical insight cannot be reduced to 
sense is of course why most readers of James just ignore it. Or it is occulted, unknowingly of 
course, in layers of cultural or historical analysis, which, needless to say, are always part of 
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 Gert Buelens has also pointed out what he calls “the discordant philosophical strategies” of The American 
Scene (1999 357). 
much more serious hermeneutical endeavors (the regular focalization upon the presence of 
racial and ethnic stereotypes in The American Scene makes that clear enough). To qualify as I 
did earlier as a “double allegiance” what in fact is a double constraint, a double bind that no 
author can have mastery over – and James is certainly not a writer who can be accused of not 
trying –, is simply to suggest that his work is best read when we take into account his earnest 
and often dead serious attempts to maintain fidelity to the two terms of this irreconcilable 
opposition. Irony is a word to describe this ruptured fidelity.
6
 
 
II. Double Allegiance and the Problem of Irony 
 
One could profitably select scenarios from almost any of the fourteen chapters of The 
American Scene to study the double allegiance at the basis of this irony more carefully. 
Indeed, most of the chapters contain one scenario in which the problem of making sense is 
brought to the foreground and dramatized in an explicit manner, in much the same way that 
important specular encounters are rendered in the author’s fictional narratives. Although they 
are very fluidly composed, the chapters do not have indeterminate, open-ended structures as is 
often suggested by critics. Instead, individual chapters tend to present themselves as 
presentations of the genetic process underwriting reflective consciousness. More precisely, 
what they present is the experience of presentation – presentment, exhibition, revelation, etc.7 
– as a specular process in which reflective consciousness establishes itself as a mediating 
entity between sensible reality and the intelligible idea which is the eidetic or formal 
condition of appearance. This condition being split, as we saw previously, in the sense that 
the idea always ultimately reveals itself in James to be a purely fictional entity deriving its 
eidetic or positing force from the rhetorical properties of language, the presentative 
experiences dramatized in The American Scene invariably unfold in a duplicitous manner, 
specular consciousness revealing itself as founded upon the foreclosure of a linguistic or 
tropological event whose uncontrollability or excess is always legible in the text.
8
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 Academic readers of a “post-deconstructive” bent will already of course have assimilated Paul de Man’s 
famous text on irony, in the second part of “The Rhetoric of Temporality,” to which I hereby allude for the 
benefit of those in a “pre-deconstructive” or in perennially dawning phases of deconstructive awareness. See also 
de Man’s “The Concept of Irony” in Aesthetic Ideology. A key use of the word “irony” in James to signify a 
ruptured fidelity to two linguistic economies can be found in “The Jolly Corner,” with the resumption of the 
genetic movement of narrative after its suspension in Brydon’s moment of “Discretion.” There, the 
contamination of the tropological economy of the text, to which Brydon momentarily “listens” across the thin 
partition of the door, and the genetic economy of the narrative as it resumes, leading to the inevitable specular 
appearance of the double, is dramatized in these terms: “something had overtaken all ironically his sense of 
proportion.” (1996 720). On this, see my Henry James. Le Principe spectral de la représentation (180-219). 
7
 Words and expressions like “the shy spectre of a revelation” (32), “a complete revelation” (39), “the last 
revelation” (137), or “the whole spectacle” (13), “picture” (15, 113), “presentment of the general scene” (136), 
“pure presentable picture” (149), “to make it presentable” (231), “publically presentable” (245), “all its best 
presentability” (248), “exhibition” (219), “represent” (37), “representation” (148, 236), “representative values” 
(227), etc., all variations, of course, of scene, are legion in the text. 
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 Presentation (Darstellung) presents itself as a question and enters the “scene” of philosophy in the critical 
philosophy of Kant, as the central question of his philosophy, as Heidegger, whose own philosophy generalizes 
the question considerably, recognized. Partly through Heidegger’s influence the question (often closely related to 
that of mimêsis) is inherited by Gerard Granel, Jacques Derrida, Jean-Luc Nancy and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, 
to mention the most prominent and most radical French thinkers whose work proceeds, to a significant extent at 
least, from their treatment of it, each tackling the subject of presentation in extraordinarily diverse ways and 
bringing out different effects or repercussions related to modern art, philosophy, literature and politics, as does 
the writing of the poet and critic Michel Deguy. The question remains submerged in the Anglo-Saxon 
philosophical reception of Kant, but enters the scene in the dramatic (or scandalous) way that one is familiar 
with in the literary theory of Paul de Man, himself influenced by the continental philosophical tradition, and who 
gives it the rhetorical inflection at the basis of deconstructive studies of literature in the United States. The 
dossier is immense, proliferating, exceeding by far anything broached upon here; apart from the few selected 
Among the more salient examples of such presentative experiences would be the 
“revelation of modernity” in part four of chapter four, where, strolling in Central Park in the 
late afternoon light – the “waning light” always being most propitious in James for the 
specular mode of revelation presented here –, the “presentment of the scene” occurs with an 
uncanny intensity of vision recalling that of the governess as she catches sight of the ghost of 
Peter Quint for the first time in chapter three of “The Turn of the Screw.” As in the ghost 
story, an extraordinary limpidness in the presentation of architectural detail is corrupted by 
the presence of a linguistic remainder – “the detail in every frontage and cornice and 
architrave, in every feature of every edifice, as sharp as the uttered words of the plea I have 
just imagined.” (136-138) 9 – which, as the comparison suggests, doubles the presentation, 
disjoins the presentational process from itself, in the same way that the New York scene itself 
is revealed in its essential modernity by the curious pictorial analogy of the Paul Veronese 
Venetians. The visionary process that “made sound somehow overflow into sight,” that made 
language, in its eidetic or rhetorical formalities, render things present in their detailed and 
differentiated presentness, accomplishes itself by exposing a difference that makes the scene 
more an allegorical rendering of itself than the revelation of presence. Dichtung and 
Darstellung, Kant’s terms for this uncouplable coupling, mesh tightly but do not fuse in 
synthetic unity. The “scene” of the presentation is divided. Anyone who takes this division or 
this difference for nothing, which in a way after all it is, does not know where James’s ghosts 
come from, fails to recognize “phantasmagoria” as the ethical or human … of this difference. 
In fact, what the restless analyst “perceives” here is nothing if not a ghostly apparition of 
things, a fictional or figural presentation which presents itself as such. James contents himself 
in calling this type of vision “‘subjective’” (201), his own use of quotation marks suggesting, 
however, that it is more complex than that, as we shall see further on. 
Another presentation of the presentative process is that of the brooding analyst’s 
hilarious succumbing to the “historic imagination” in Independence Hall in Philadelphia. 
There, James writes, “the interval drops out and we mingle in the business.” What is the 
“business”? Nothing less of course than the concocting of the Declaration of Independence by 
the original concocters who, probably out of reverence, go unnamed in this scenario wherein 
the speech act of all American speech acts, no doubt the felicitous speech act par excellence, 
from the author’s own perspective that is, is witnessed afresh, re-performed, re-imagined, not 
to say lampooned as an event that is not grounded in itself, does not originate in a deliberate 
and self-conscious utterance, is not serious, but is rather an etiolated, parasitic, impure act 
inspired by what J.L. Austen would have called the “backstage artiste” of the scene, of the 
place, “the charming facts” of which “go[…] of themselves” to produce – in a metaleptic 
foreshadowing of the restless analyst’s own speech acts – a “document” of the “highest” and 
most “sacred” order, presented or staged as divided from itself (214-216).10 
                                                                                                                                                                     
works by some of the aforementioned authors listed in the bibliography, which offer a glimpse into the question, 
see Alison Ross’s excellent, if necessarily cursory, treatment of the subject in her book devoted to Kant, 
Heidegger, Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe (2007), and her article on Kant and Derrida (2001); see Beaufret and 
Gasché for perhaps the most succinct discussions of the notion of presentation (Darstellung, Hypotyposis) in 
Kant. 
9
 Here are a few details from the analogous scene in “The Turn of the Screw”: “He was in one of the angles […] 
with both hands on the ledge. So I see him as I form the letters I form on this page; then […] he slowly changed 
his place – passed […] to the opposite corner of the platform. […] and I can see at this moment the way his 
hand, as he went, moved from one of the crenellations to the next. He stopped at the other corner […].” (1999 
16-17) 
10
 J. Hillis Miller discusses Austin’s theory of speech acts in Speech Acts in Literature, where I take the 
“backstage artiste” quote from, p. 33. See also Miller’s Literature as Conduct. Speech Acts in Henry James, 
which alas does not include a chapter on The American Scene. Gert Buelens points out how the “almost” in this 
scenario (“the historic imagination, reascending the centuries, almost catches them in the act of directly 
suggesting the celebrated coup” [215]) suffices to keep agency on the side of the Founding Fathers (2000 411). 
The presentation that unfolds in the “Museum of the relics of the Confederacy” (282-
285), in the Richmond chapter, is also interesting for the way it stages the rhetorical 
(in)determination of historical sense. Here, in a chapter that is crucial for its introduction of 
the restless analyst’s civic consciousness of the post-Civil War South, sensible reality is 
presented as having “disengage[d] itself,” as “legend,” from the “idea” (“the flame-coloured 
idea has flowered out of the fact”), in accordance with the speculative interpretation of history 
everywhere in evidence in The American Scene (I shall return to this subject), a speculative 
fiction of history, of course, that presents the South as riddled with traces of separation, waste, 
excess, queerness, in short, as an artless world where sign and referent appear radically 
disjoined, a disjunction that is read in its turn as signifying the South’s defeat. Yet rather than 
reading this chapter as a literal presentation of historical truth in the eyes of the restless 
analyst, it should be read as a text about the (precarious) passage from text to history, as the 
Museum presentation makes clear with its tropological (“enchanted carpet”) and linguistic 
(“some verbal rendering of the grey effect”) allusions to the rhetorical language that makes 
this presentation possible, in other words as another text about the impure performativity of 
rhetorical language in the production of historical meaning.
11
 
Or else the stepping forth of “lonely Aphrodite” into the American light of the Boston 
Art Museum where she has been transplanted from her native Greece, not to lose symbolic 
power, however, from the displacement, as one would perhaps expect, but gaining rather in 
aesthetic beauty and significance in accordance with a genetic foreshortening of figurative 
possibilities that presents the presentative process as a historical synecdoche, not a gradual 
accretion of meaning over time but a leap of the statue from its ground into the reflective 
status of a trans-historical (and trans-national) figure subsuming its past (187-188). 
Synecdoches like this, where the figure separates itself from its context to stand for the whole 
of that context, frequently appear in James’s work in a temporalizing manner inscribing figure 
and ground in a genetic structure of thought or narrative linking past to present. A good 
example is at the beginning of “The Beast in the Jungle” where May Bartram – whom John 
Marcher would previously have met at the site of an excavation at Pompeii, an important spot 
in James’s travel writings, as we shall see further on – steps into the reflective gaze of the 
protagonist as a “voice” and a “face” which encrypts (1996 498), for this protagonist, the 
epistemological leap or difference that the trope of synecdoche implies. It would not be too 
difficult to show that the historic imagination in James’s travel writings often turns upon the 
use of this trope to initiate the fiction – “fond luxurious fallacy” (1993 614) – of an intimate 
“relation” between the present and the past. Recognizing the “fallacy” of this relation (as 
“readers” like Marcher fail to do) implies a recognition of the figural difference introduced by 
the trope responsible for establishing the relation itself. 
Let me not forget, and to give just one more brief example, for the moment, of the 
presentative process upon which, as I have said, nearly every chapter in The American Scene 
turns as upon its “ironic center” (1984 1162), the morning stroll in Salem dedicated to the 
memory of Hawthorne. This stroll culminates in a performative reverie, mediated, one will 
recall, by the charmingly native boy (reinforcing in ethnic terms a fallacious sense of aesthetic 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Indeed, the “almost” modifies the truth value of the brooding analyst’s vision, introducing a scepticism that 
always emerges in James’s reflections on the historic imagination, but not its performative character as a 
revision of the historic occasion and its metaleptic prefiguring of the analyst’s own speech act(s). In other words, 
I am not claiming that James literally removes agency from the founding act of the Fathers, but that he 
underscores with perhaps the most foundational analogy possible the irony or the fictional negativity of his own 
“documentary” act, in Austin’s terms its infelicitous or impure character. Buelens is interested in the “comic 
strategy” (410) of James’s treatment of the Founding Fathers and the site of the Declaration’s signing, I am 
interested in how these figures are orchestrated in a process revealing how historical meaning itself is produced. 
11
 On the relation between text and history in James, see Andrzej Warminski’s admirable rhetorical reading of 
“The Altar of the Dead.” 
closure or identity about to be overturned), about the allegorical disjunction between the 
“origin or reference” of literary symbol and the “inner force” of its “idea,” the rhetorical 
condition of the latter establishing a “connection” to the former which has “turned a 
somersault into space,” James writes, and been “repudiated like a ladder kicked back from the 
top of a wall.” (200-201) This imagery of tropological turning, of excess and of disjunction 
retrospectively invalidates the fond Emersonian fallacy of symbolic harmony – between 
“wisdom and poetry,” “Wahrheit and Dichtung” – sanctioned just prior to this in the Concord 
excursion (196); that fallacy which, as I have suggested, much criticism of The American 
Scene hesitates to go beyond.
12
 
Each of these scenarios shows James rigorously fulfilling the cognitive exigency of 
adequation between figural language and meaning, on one hand, and ready to pull the carpet 
out from under the feet of cognitive awareness on the other. More precisely, they show him 
caught in the double constraint or double bind mentioned earlier. For the more intensely this 
awareness tries to resolve its fictional negativity in the presentation of things, as in the 
revelation of modernity that occurs in Central Park, the more inevitably that negativity in the 
form of the medium of presentation, language, presents itself to obscure the transparency of 
the presentative process. From a reflective standpoint, the more consciousness tries to present 
to itself the presentative process on which it is based the greater the likelihood it will 
encounter the limits of presentation as a tropological structure over which it has no control, 
however masterfully James inscribes the figural properties of language within a genetic 
system that would subordinate them to cognitive processes. James often appears to wish to 
display the most masterful designs in linking the cognitive to the tropological, but of course 
the very displaying undoes the link. This is not to say that he contrives to conceal the 
difference. The linking is of course inevitable. If he concealed the difference, he would be 
forfeiting his ironic insight to the kind of specular mystification that he exposes in the most 
blinkered of his characters, like John Marcher, or indulging in the aesthetic ideology he 
reveals in the “hotel-spirit” of the Waldorf Astoria, in The American Scene, where the puppet-
lives of its victims go on “blissfully exempt from any principle or possibility of disaccord 
with itself”. Here, in accordance with the organizational “genius” of the place, “publicity as 
the vital medium” suppresses or forecloses the possibility of encountering the presentative 
limit of the “medium” itself (80-81). That limit which, I am suggesting, exposes itself in each 
of the presentative experiences that are presented in The American Scene. What I’m calling 
the presentative limit is what James, in the final chapter when he returns at length to the 
subject of America’s ideologically blinded and bemused, calls the “deceptive stitch” that the 
uncritical mind invariably fails to observe (“so placidly uncritical that the whitest thread of 
the deceptive stitch never makes it blink” [337]). What James calls the “technical 
imagination” (82) – nothing less, in Nietzschian terms, than the will to power as a will to 
suppress the experience of presentation as an experience of finitude – is the spectacular (in 
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 That it is a fallacy, however fond to its momentary beholder, is even clearer when this pair of scenarios is 
examined more carefully in their context. James emphasizes the Goethian and Schilleresque aspects of 
Transcendentalism in his Concord sketch only to rebuke in the Salem sub-chapter “the poor illusion of a 
necessity of relation between the accomplished thing, for poetry, for art, and those other quite equivocal things 
that we inflate our ignorance with seeing it suggested by” (201), a phrase which directly undermines the prior 
sanctioning of a sentiment of genetic causality between “things” and “images” in his performative reverie riffing 
off of Emersonian symbolism (“as if we were still seeing these [Concord] things in those [Emerson’s] images” 
[196]), ruining in the process any dream of a Dichtung/Wahrheit synthesis. The words “inflate our ignorance 
with seeing” in the phrase just quoted should probably be emphasized. What this chapter eloquently reveals is 
that James of course is an allegorist, not a symbolist, but his allegorism differs from Hawthorne’s in the amount 
of daylight he wishes to leave between image and thing, sign and referent. In short, not much. On allegory in The 
American Scene see Sheila Teahan’s remarkably concise study of the trope in her essay dealing with the 
engendering of culture in the text. 
Debord’s sense of the term) foreclosure of the difference or the disjunction in being of which 
the brooding tourist’s “critically” or “analytically” minded (202) soliloquies are the ironical 
exposure. But to stick to him for the moment – I shall return shortly to the question of 
presentation as an experience of finitude and the condition of historicity –, there is no way 
out, for the brooding tourist, of the aforementioned double constraint, not even by submitting 
himself to it so fully that he can sometimes appear almost to have it both ways. The more 
earnestly he submits himself to this double allegiance, the more inevitably the disjunction 
between them materializes, one linguistic economy contaminating (not fusing with) the other 
and the breach (or the “deceptive stitch”) between them exposing itself, which is what makes 
the ironical outlook on things the only viable one, from a “critical” or “analytical” 
perspective. Not that this irony amounts to any kind of superior knowledge, of course, for in 
terms of the subjectivity involved it is nothing if not the expression of a certain kind of 
helplessness. It is a good thing to have, much better than the seriousness of writers and critics 
who themselves ignore the breach between the performative and the constative, the 
tropological and the specular, and go about making all kinds of statements about the meaning 
of literary texts with a greater or lesser degree of modesty and epistemological rigor. Yet 
irony puts one, as the narrator of The Sacred Fount declares at the end of that most 
scandalously ironical of all of James’s narratives, “altogether nowhere” (1953 319).13 
The brooding tourist does not want to be altogether nowhere. Jamesian irony is 
sometimes a rather somber, if not gloomy, affair. Being the result of an epistemological rigor 
that the author cannot avoid, cannot sidestep in any manner, and the source of conflict 
between ethical and aesthetic injunctions that James explored with unrelenting seriousness in 
his late work, irony rarely serves the solely aesthetic purpose of pleasure in his writing, 
although there are occasional moments of forthright indulgence in it, as in the scenario that 
unfolds in Independence Hall (“‘What an admirable place for a Declaration of something! 
[…] I say, why not our independence – capital thing always to declare, and before anyone 
gets in with anything tactless.’”). On the whole though, to borrow and abuse somewhat one of 
James’s own images, irony in his work is a bit like the mirthful South all outfitted in 
Protestant attire (231). James does not easily let himself be merely amused by it. And then 
there is the risk that irony and repetition, for The American Scene is nothing if not repetitive 
in its presentation of the presentative experience, will be mistaken for complicity with the 
power they resemble and fail empirically to critique, as Mark Seltzer illustrates so superbly in 
his political (or politicized) and historical (historicized) interpretation of The American Scene. 
Perhaps James has himself to blame to a certain degree for the fact that readers find it so easy 
to remain oblivious to his irony, since he himself was so serious about it. Yet there are other 
reasons which explain this obliviousness, of course. It is easy to see why anyone wishing to 
extract from The American Scene a pragmatic critical awareness capable of countering the 
American spirit of totalizing (and potentially totalitarian) spectacle must ignore the ironic 
structure of the text. For if irony allows for no totality, no closure (or foreclosure) of the text, 
it allows for no stable or reliable “subjectivity” either. Just as the narrator of The Sacred 
Fount cannot win his argument with Mrs. Brissendon in the final chapters of that book and 
must simply leave Newmarch, the critical analyst of The American Scene, faced with the 
“paradise” (81) or “heaven” (329) of the American spirit which he knows is an illusion since 
it is based on the foreclosure of the very finitude of which he is ironically aware – that is, 
aware in an equivocal way which undermines the empirical value of his awareness –, must 
content himself, as James as author must, with repeating the presentative process as a 
presentative experience of finitude, with the knowledge of course that it will be readable, but 
with no hope of making it applicable to the empirical world. Irony cannot empirically counter 
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 I attempt to deal with this scandal as it presents itself in James’s own conflicted apprehension of it in 
“L’inquiétante modernité de The Sacred Fount.” 
the technical imagination as a suppression of presentation as an experience of finitude, but in 
presenting presentation repeatedly, bringing it into the open as a question, in the form of the 
text, finitude is exposed as the unsurpassable and ineluctable experience of presentation. 
That is why presentation as a question is the principle obsession of The American 
Scene. Presentation – the “scene” of The American Scene – is a haunting experience in the 
sense that it is incorrigibly divided from itself, and this hauntedness, no more than the ironical 
mode of discourse of which it is a trace, is unlikely to present itself as a viable form of 
cognitive awareness to compete with the “organizational” spirit of the world and the aesthetic 
ideology of harmony and closure it entails.
14
 Yet precisely insofar as presentation remains a 
question, and this must eternally be the case, since there is no surmounting the double bind 
which is its condition, that question possesses and even presents to the world in a certain 
manner a critical force. That critical force does not belong, however, to a subject. It belongs 
only to the text. 
 
III. Sargent’s Portrait: Irony as the Presentation of Liberty 
 
Let me turn then to one presentation of the presentative experience in the The 
American Scene that stands slightly apart from the others, if only because it introduces them 
in a certain manner. In other words, presents them. Even though presentation cannot fully 
present itself, which is why it remains a question, James is always trying to foreground, in one 
way or another, the process, as he does here by offering what is doubtless the most theatrical, 
not to say spectacular, presentation of the presentative experience right off the bat, in the 
book’s first chapter15. This is the scenario that unfolds in Harvard Hall where the brooding 
analyst encounters Sargent’s portrait of Major Henry Lee Higginson. Like Nick Dormer’s 
encounter with Gabriel Nash early in the first book of The Tragic Muse, or John Marcher’s 
fateful encounter with May Bartram in the opening paragraphs of “The Beast in the Jungle,” 
the encounter with Sargent’s portrait is a specular presentation of the tropological structure of 
language that reduces, or foreshortens, that structure into the reflective basis of consciousness, 
stabilizing perception and calming the restless analyst’s exposure to epistemological tension 
(“and so eased off the intensity” of the “appeal” of “ghosts” [48]). 
Clearly James is setting the stage here for the succession of such encounters that occur 
in The American Scene, where the “relation,” as he often puts it, between aspect and meaning, 
appearance and sense, impression and idea is constituted in the same genetic process of 
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 That may seem obvious, but it is clearly not obvious to empirically minded readers, like Seltzer, who insists on 
the “underlying unity and discreet continuity” between “art” and “power” in The American Scene (Seltzer 109). 
It is difficult not to see such readings as resentful, in Nietzsche’s sense of the word, of art, that is of the radical 
disjunction at the heart of the presentative experience of life. Seltzer, who sees a tendency on the part of even the 
most politically conscious critics to “depoliticize” and to “dehistoricize” literary texts (139), criticizes readers of 
The American Scene who see a “discontinuity between artistic and referential imperatives” and states his own 
conviction of an “entanglement between compositional and historical, discursive and political practices,” 
claiming that the “scandal” he wishes to expose is not in James’s “artful evasion or disavowal of the actualities 
of history and power” but rather in that he “risks, calls attention to, this scandal in order to repress what is truly 
scandalous about his text: not an opposition between art and power but an underlying unity and discreet 
continuity between them.” In the next sentence this “unity” and “discreet continuity” become a “collaboration” 
(109), further on a “surreptitious linkage” (125), and one could go on. In short, James plays the aesthete in a 
secret ploy for power. The resentfulness I see in this apparently sophisticated reading of The American Scene is 
not by any means merely personal, of course, but an effect of a very widespread tendency in criticism to fall 
back into the concerns of the self in the empirical world in the encounter with literary texts. Where these 
concerns are not by any means obvious, then they are resentfully supposed to be “surreptitiously” present. 
15
 In her article included in this collection, Marie-Odile Salati shows that the 1905 essay that serves as the initial 
chapter of English Hours functions to highlight in a similar manner key elements of the scenarios that
  
are 
repeated throughout the succeeding chapters of that book which were written previously.
 
specular presentation that is dramatized here, always, as I have insisted, with the evidence of a 
certain linguistic residue or tropological excess. James here is representing the presentative 
process, insisting on the specular character of perception and on its genetic principle as it will 
be deployed in The American Scene, and emphasizing furthermore what I have called the 
double bind at the basis of its ironic mode of discourse, that is the allegiance both to cognitive 
and to tropological figural economies. Representation must be understood here as a form of 
presentative insistence, and indeed of repetitive insistence, not as imitation. 
Not only is the presentative logic of the Harvard Hall scenario deployed throughout 
The American Scene, as a model of sorts of things to come, were it thereafter in a less 
explicitly specular manner, but it also turns out to be a repetition of important scenarios that 
unfold in English Hours (and in a slightly different form in Transatlantic Sketches) and 
Italian Hours. Indeed, the presentative logic at work in The American Scene is deployed 
throughout James’s travel writings and is by no means unique to the late travelogue. The 
presentative scenario in English Hours I am referring to that most explicitly echoes the 
scenario at Harvard Hall is the twilight presentation of Haddon Hall in the Lichfield and 
Warwick chapter (1993a 73-75) – the rooks “wheeling” and “clamoring” in the sky as they do 
at Bly, to mention another repetition of this scenario, just before the governess’s specular 
apprehension of the ghost of Peter Quint in the scene previously referred to –, and the 
scenario in Italian Hours I have in mind is the tourist’s “fond luxurious fallacy of a close 
communion, a direct revelation” of Pompeii (1993b 613-614) in the late sketch entitled “The 
Saint’s Afternoon,” also under a falling light that so often dramatizes in James, as I suggested 
earlier, the specular turn that reduces the tropological ground of the soliloquy, mimed by the 
wheeling and circling of the birds at Haddon Hall, to the reflective basis of consciousness. I 
have proposed readings of these scenarios elsewhere so will not do so here.
16
 A few elements 
of these intense presentative experiences are worth insisting on, however, to enhance 
recognition of what occurs in the Harvard Hall scenario and with regard to the question of 
aesthetic presentation in general. 
It is worth noting, for instance, that Pompeii figures in both scenarios, since, as James 
observes in English Hours, the “comparison is odd, but Haddon Hall reminded me perversely 
of some of the larger houses at Pompeii.” (1993a 75) This is worth noting because Pompeii, 
as the archeological site par excellence, stands for a buried past which it is so often a matter, 
in James’s travel writing, of excavating by means of the specular presentation of its “idea.” 
Lacking such figures of historical depth in his native land, the presentative experience of the 
restored absentee is often dependent, of course, on distant memories dug up from his personal 
past, as he informs us from the opening paragraph of The American Scene. Yet, since memory 
and history are but the two sides of the same aesthetic coin for James, and since temporal 
depth is a presentational effect created by the semiotic alignment of figure and ground, image 
and thing, it matters little, from a performative point of view, where the ideal to be presented 
in sensible form comes from. Because it is precisely an ideal, not in the Platonist sense but in 
the sense that it exists nowhere, has no reality whatsoever, other than in the eidetic formalities 
or rhetorical properties of language, it is an excellent thing to have places like Pompeii to 
wander about in which offer, at modest expense to the traveller, the stagecraft necessary to an 
imagination as speculative as that of James. For it is, of course, all stagecraft. Technè 
mimesthai. From Emerson’s Concord to Haddon Hall, from Mount Vernon to Pompeii, it is 
all a borrowing of scenery to erect a rather private play. If the historical scenery is lacking, as 
in America of course it often is, then the scenery of one’s private past, the “archaeology of 
intimate memory,” must suffice.17 Whatever its source, only an insubstantial idea can present 
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 Henry James. Le Principe spectral de la représentation, p. 373-391. 
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 See Marie-Odile Salati’s discussion of the “archaeology of intimate memory” (“l’archéologie du souvenir 
intime”) in her study of The American Scene (97-100) 
reality, that is to say itself, with the kind of rich, detailed, penetrating slices of life that James 
likes. Only an idea not too self-consciously conceived in advance can present itself and things 
realistically, not only because one does not want to have any allegorical stagecraft hanging 
visibly over the scene (which sometimes in fact doesn’t bother James too much), as would be 
the case with a preconceived idea, one too voluntarily contrived for the occasion, but because 
such an idea would have little or no speculative capacity, would exhaust its performative 
potential in a thinly iconic encounter with the real, like Hawthorne’s letter lighting up the sky 
over Boston in The Scarlet Letter, instead of (dis)appearing in the sensible exhibition of 
things. Or else would scarcely be a “relation” at all, a presentation merely of facts, for which 
newspapers and photography suffice. A good abstract idea like “modernity” in the Central 
Park revelation, with a little stagecraft borrowed from Veronese, can also turn the trick. Or the 
idea of a man like Washington, to metonymically present his home at Mount Vernon.
18
 For 
T.S. Eliot was right to say that James had “a mind so fine that no idea could violate it,” if we 
understand by this that no idea could present itself to James that did not present (itself as) 
reality. An unpresented idea does not exist for James, and when it presents itself it is reality 
that is presented. The scene appears lit from within. His brooding tourists have ideas only as 
they incarnate themselves, or on the ghostly verge of incarnation. But that the idea should 
come from very far back, either historically or in memory, as most often is the case, is above 
all essential to the performativity of the genetic principle of presentation. It is precisely the 
long extension of the “backward reach” (70), the over-reaching reach of the genetic process 
of memory and of the historical imagination, grasping towards an unreachable anteriority, that 
makes the presentative process so performative, so impurely performative, and the 
“speculative tension” (247) so intense.19 For an ideal idea presents itself as the intimation of 
an immemorial past, beyond the reach of voluntary memory and enlisting thereby, in the 
appeal for sensible presentation, all the rhetorical and mimetic faculties at the restless ironist’s 
disposal. These then “minister to” (a verb James solicits frequently) the presentation of the 
idea as sensible reality, or of this reality as an idea. Indeed, insofar as they are structured 
genetically, memory and the historical imagination, the “fatal historic sense” (1993b 610), are 
not authentic temporal structures: the Italian hours, the English hours signify rhetorical 
instances of cognitive awareness not the passing of time. Temporality, finitude, the truly 
historical character of the presentative experience is not presented in the genetic structure of 
the process but in the difference between that process and its linguistic or tropological excess. 
The Harvard Hall scenario presents this excess or disjunction as an unavowable 
reserve of meaning effaced in the specular and genetic process of aesthetic representation. It 
is upon this unavowable reserve of meaning that the trope of irony, the dominant trope of The 
American Scene, is based. One need only consider an instant the awful revelation, repulsive, 
sickening to the restless analyst, of “the hotel-spirit in sole articulate possession” (326, 
emphasis not mine) of the American scene, as we read in the final chapter, James’s long 
meditation on the aesthetic ideology to come, a post-face, really, to the work, on the Spectacle 
to come of actors without art in a miraculous world without theatre, without presentation, 
everyone an actor-spectator turning circles in front of his own publicity stunts – a world, in 
other words, wherein the “aesthetic revel” (327) of presentation is occulted by, and inevitably 
passes for, mere aestheticism, a world ripe for “cultural studies” –, to recognize perhaps the 
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 “The beauty of the site, meanwhile, as we stand there, becomes but the final aspect of the man; under which 
everything conduces to a single great representative image, under which every feature of the scene, every object 
in the house, however trivial, borrows from it and profits by it.” (248-249) 
19
 In the Transatlantic Sketches version of the Haddon Hall scenario presentation is achieved with “almost 
painful intensity” (1875 26), revised in English Hours to the apparently less embarrassing “the last, the right 
intensity.” (1993a 74). Presentative experience is an affective experience which, as the two opposing 
formulations suggest, is related to the well-known ambivalence of the sublime, a subject which can only be 
alluded to here. 
critical value of this reserve, of this inarticulate remainder, of which irony is, let’s say, the 
ambassador. But I shall return to this critical value in a moment. 
The figural logic of the scenario at Harvard Hall turns upon a metonymic reversal of 
past and future that rhetoricians call metalepsis.
20
 Essential to the presentative scenario is the 
leap outside of empirical reality into the tropological fiction of the sign. For what occurs here 
is that the “backward vision” of the restless analyst reverses itself – at “day’s end,” the typical 
stage-lighting in James for this kind of reversal – into a forward-looking or proleptic 
perspective in the hopes that “inspiration” will be able to catch up to itself by its “projection” 
of a specular image reflecting the past. The specular image of Higginson’s portrait, we shall 
see in an instant, functions as a “commemoration” of the past that enables what James calls 
inspiration, outrunning itself, to reclaim itself at the end of what on first sight appears to be 
the accomplishment of a genetic act of cognition, linking the projected future to the past, but 
is in fact revealed to be determined by a metaleptic twist or turn that is irreducible to 
cognitive behavior. The discontinuity between cognitive awareness before and after this turn, 
or the gap between the genetic process of cognition and the tropological reversal which 
underwrites it, is thematized by James, figuratively of course, by the transport of a “magic 
carpet” by which the gap is traversed; the key event, upon which the genetic structure of 
cognition turns out to be based, is a tropological leap from empirical reality into the reflective 
fiction of the sign that Sargent’s portrait represents. Here it necessary to read the scenario in 
its entirety. 
  
It was after all in the great Hall of the Union perhaps (to come back to that delicate 
day’s end) that the actual vibration of response seemed most to turn to audible music […]. For 
the case was unmistakably that just there, more than anywhere, by a magnificent stroke, an 
inspiration working perhaps even beyond its consciousness, the right provision had been made 
for the remembering mind. The place was addressed in truth so largely to an enjoying and 
producing future that it might seem to frown on mere commemoration, on the backward vision; 
and yet, at the moment I speak of, its very finest meaning might have been that of a liberal 
monument to those who had come and gone, to the company of the lurking ghosts. The air was 
full of them, and this was its service, that it cared for them all, and so eased off the intensity of 
their appeal. And yet it appeared to play that part for a reason more interesting than reducible to 
words – a reason that mainly came out for me while, in the admirable hall aforesaid, I stood 
before Sargent’s high portrait of Major Henry Lee Higginson, donatorio of the house (as well as 
author, all round about, of innumerable other civil gifts); a representation of life and character, a 
projection of genius, which even that great painter has never outdone. Innumerable, ever, are the 
functions performed and the blessings wrought by the supreme work of art, but I know of no 
such case in which it has been so given to such a work to make the human statement with a 
great effect, to interfuse a group of public acts with the personality, with the characteristics of 
the actor. The acts would still have had all their value if the portrait had had less, but they would 
not assuredly have been able to become so interesting, would not have grown to affect each 
beneficiary, however obscure, as proceeding, for him, from a possible relation, a possible 
intimacy. It is to the question of intimacy with somebody or other that all great practical public 
recognition is finally carried back – but carried only by the magic carpet, when the magic carpet 
happens to be there. Mr. Sargent’s portrait of Henry Higginson is exactly the magic carpet. (47-
48) 
 
James’s aesthetic creed of a humanistic reduction of the tropological conditions of 
experience is fully thematized here in dramatic terms, not only in the representation of 
Sargent’s portrait of Henry Higginson (“a representation of life and character”), but in the 
textual presentation of the presentative experience in which that representation appears, or, as 
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 See Paul de Man’s discussion of this trope in his reading of Wordsworth’s “The Winander Boy” (de Man, 
1993 74-94). 
the term donatorio suggests, gives itself.
21
 On the simplest level, the portrait presents itself to 
the restless tourist as a stable reflective surface upon which all the “ghosts” of the past, traces 
of the backward vision, find commemorative representation, marking the achievement of a 
genetic process linking the past to present in temporal unity. According to this genetic logic 
an “inspiration working perhaps even beyond its consciousness” will have managed to catch 
up to itself, to find in its “projection” an end reflecting its origin, closing the loop of cognitive 
self-awareness. This genetic model of temporal consciousness turns out, however, as I’ve 
already mentioned, to be an illusion conditioned by the metaleptic leap out of empirical 
reality into the fiction of the sign. The linguistic character of the presentative experience is 
thematized from the outset by the allusion to a certain “vibration” turning to “audible music,” 
such vibrations and music commonly figuring in James (see “The Turn of the Screw” and The 
Sacred Fount, for example) a linguistic faculty which cannot be appropriated by the subject 
by other means than its specular foreshortening or reduction, which is why when the portrait 
presents itself it is said to be of a quality “more interesting than reducible to words.” As we 
saw in the Central Park presentation “that made sound somehow overflow into sight,” 
Darstellung implies the negation of Dichtung, since the former is precisely the 
accomplishment of the latter, that is of a certain tropological activity which one should not 
too hastily reduce to an empirical act of speech
22
. Indeed, the linguistic performativity 
presented here is “inhuman” in the sense that the tropes upon which presentative experience 
depends are by no means continuous with the specular (re)presentation of this experience as a 
“human statement.” The “magic carpet” that links the two is itself the specular operation of a 
trope, a metaleptic reversal which, as this fabulist or unrealistic image of flying suggests, 
cognition has no control over, no mastery of, despite the ineluctable attempt to inscribe this 
movement within a genetic process in which consciousness reclaims authority for itself. 
James reveals the cognitive fiction of an adequate relation between consciousness and tropes 
and the empirically insurmountable disjunction between the two. For, once again, the 
performative dimension of language which is thematized here as an “inspiration working 
perhaps even beyond its consciousness” catches up to itself, is reduced to constative terms, 
only by means of what is a literally inconceivable substitution of empirical reality by a 
fictional representation, that is by Sargent’s portrait. Like the “deceptive stitch” alluded to 
earlier, the “magic carpet” designates a disjunction between the genetic structure of 
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 Much could be said about James’s use of the word “donatorio” to designate the donation or giving of human 
sense that occurs here with the specular reduction of the tropological. The specular turn always consists of a 
donation of sense, of a giving and of a human figuring of sense, except where, as in texts like “The Turn of the 
Screw,” the process breaks down in the paradoxical revelation of itself amidst the cognitive act it conditions. If 
in a general, schematic manner the “reflectors” of James’s fiction can be divided into those for which the 
specular donation of sense breaks down in its revelation (the governess) and those for which the donation as 
such is occulted (John Marcher), these two cases marking the limit experiences of reflective consciousness, The 
American Scene, on the contrary, demonstrates in each of the presentative experiences presented the double 
allegiance to both specular and tropological linguistic economies, reflective self-awareness and otherness. Only 
in “The Jolly Corner,” written shortly after The American Scene, does James manage as effectively to present the 
double injunction which traverses his entire work. On what would appear to be James’s misuse of the Italian 
word, donatorio, see Daniel Hannah‘s discussion of Sargent’s portrait (166). 
22
 Michel Imbert’s readings of The American Scene (2001, 2003) draw their critical force from this critic’s 
sensitivity to the materialism of linguistic excess, not, however, as a non-phenomenal material contamination of 
one linguistic economy by another, in accordance with the double constraint inherent to all discursive structures 
and critically presented by the literary text, but rather as an irruption of material linguistic alterity within the 
literary discourse of the “aesthete.” The discontinuity is located in the psyche of the writer alienated or 
dispossessed by language rather than in the figural (non-phenomenal) event which the literary text presents. This 
ultimately makes of the discontinuity an empirical event, which Imbert would have constitute the ground of a 
“cultural materialism” (2003) subverting “aesthetic” discourse, instead of an event which must remain forever 
beyond the reach of empirical understanding and calling for aesthetic (literary, pictorial, musical, etc.) 
presentation. 
consciousness and the tropological principle which traverses it, a disjunction which is 
overcome only by means of a specular fiction. The genetic process of the “remembering 
mind,” for which “provision” will have been made, James writes,” by a “magnificent stroke,” 
is dependent upon a tropological event, a leap from empirical to fictional reality, that memory 
can make no authentic claim of assimilating. Once again, however, far from dissimulating the 
heterogeneity between the tropological and the cognitive, the performative and the descriptive 
economies of language in which presentative experience is inscribed, James thematizes this 
heterogeneity in dramatic terms. 
Before concluding it is worth pointing out that the metaleptic turn dramatized at the 
beginning of The American Scene is reproduced, as a chiasmatic repetition of the first, at the 
end of the penultimate chapter of the book devoted to Charleston, where, instead of “landing” 
in the fictional sign of Sargent’s portrait, the leap from empirical reality remains suspended 
until the “aftertime” of James’s text, that is the time of the (re)presentation in writing of the 
presentation which unfolds here as the “canvas” of St. Michael’s Church (309-310). The 
disjunctive leap between the empirical before and the figural after of the presentative event is 
no longer speculated, then, as in the book’s opening chapter, by the reflective image of the 
portrait – Sargent being the double of the brooding tourist in the sense that his portrait is a 
specular image of the presentative experience that is presented by the text – but by the text 
itself. In other words, what is dramatized at the end of the book is the tropological disjunction, 
the figurative bark designating it changing however from a magic carpet to a drifting skiff 
(“making my skiff fast to no conclusion whatever, only pushing out again and letting it, for a 
supreme impression and to prepare in the aftertime the best remembrance, drift where it 
would”), between the third-person figure of the restless analyst and the first-person figure of 
the author in the aftertime of the presentative event (“it [the skiff] touches now once more of 
its own motion, carries me back and puts me ashore on the one spot where my impression had 
been perfectly felicitous” [my emphasis]). The book winding now to its completion, the 
specular fiction of visual experience which Sargent’s portrait served to establish is elegantly 
abandoned and the disjunction at the heart of the presentative experience is metonymically 
presented as the difference between the brooding tourist prior to the proleptic turn (“to 
prepare in the aftertime the best remembrance”) and the writer as the future artistic 
beneficiary of its accomplishment, or, from the retrospective perspective of the finished work, 
between the fictional self of the traveller and the empirical self of the author. The American 
Scene is thematically inscribed between a leap into the specular fiction of cognitive 
perception, on one hand, and a leap into a written text on the other, both events being of 
course inconceivable in empirical terms, but solely as the action of tropes upon which the 
genetic structure of consciousness always reveals itself in James to be based. Memory, like 
historical consciousness, is not a cognitive act at all but a tropological one. Although this 
insight is demonstrated in each of the presentative experiences presented by the text, James 
emphasizes in particularly dramatic terms at the outset and at the end of the narrative (the 
final chapter being, as I have suggested, a bleak post-face of empirical triumph in which the 
presentative experience of life is ideologically suppressed) that there is no way back from our 
empirical world to the experience of The American Scene that does not pass through the 
disjunctive turn of the trope, of tropological signs in general. 
Like the other presentative experiences presented (or represented) by James’s text, but 
at a more explicit level of apprehension, the Harvard Hall scenario presents the double 
allegiance that constantly emerges in The American Scene and which is constitutive, I have 
argued, of the discursive irony of the text. The text is an ironic parable of the textual 
experience of life, “textual” here referring to the disjunctive play of the trope, of Dichtung, of 
impurely performative language as it determines, and exceeds, human consciousness. The 
ironic structure of the text undercuts its own possibility of saying anything in a reliably 
documentary manner, just as it ruins in advance the critic’s ability to say anything about its 
social, cultural, political or historical referentiality in a reliable, that is critical, manner. The 
critical force of the text lies elsewhere: not in its documentary appeal but in the presentation 
of the experience of presentation as an experience of finitude, which is the condition of 
historicity itself. The truly historical event is an event beyond the reach of human imagination 
which imagination manages nonetheless to register as such, to be affected by. It is such events 
that are repeatedly, obsessively presented in The American Scene, which is therefore, and in 
this sense precisely, a historical text. It is not a historical text because of the history it makes 
reference to, however much this history may interest us, but because of the history it makes, 
presentative experience testifying in necessarily figural terms to the discontinuity at the heart 
of presentative experience itself. The text’s irony, finally, is not constraining but the 
presentation of liberty, of deliverance from the American spirit, more delusional and 
oppressive in its enthrallment to spectacle in our day certainly than in 1907. Yet this liberty is 
before us, it is presented to us. It is not between the lines of the text nor in some context to be 
divulged from it, but in the text itself as the presentative experience of life. It asks one thing 
of us only, nothing else, which is that we become readers of it. 
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